Thus far, several lattice-based algorithms for partial key exposure attacks on RSA, i.e., given the most/least significant bits (MSBs/LSBs) of a secret exponent d and factoring an RSA modulus N , have been proposed such as Blömer and May (Crypto'03), Ernst et al. (Eurocrypt'05), and Aono (PKC'09). Due to Boneh and Durfee's small secret exponent attack, partial key exposure attacks should always work for d < N 0.292 even without any partial information. However, it was difficult task to make use of the given partial information without losing the quality of Boneh-Durfee's attack. In particular, known partial key exposure attacks fail to work for d < N 0.292 with only few partial information. Such unnatural situation stems from the fact that the additional information makes underlying modular equations involved. In this paper, we propose improved attacks when a secret exponents d is small. Our attacks are better than all known previous attacks in the sense that our attacks require less partial information. Specifically, our attack is better than all known ones for d < N 0.5625 and d < N 0.368 with the MSBs and the LSBs, respectively. Furthermore, our attacks fully cover the Boneh-Durfee bound, i.e., they always work for d < N 0.292 . At a high level, we obtain the improved attacks by fully utilizing unravelled linearization technique proposed by Herrmann and May (Asiacrypt'09). Although Herrmann and May (PKC'10) already applied the technique to Boneh-Durfee's attack, we show elegant and impressive extensions to capture partial key exposure attacks. More concretely, we construct structured triangular matrices that enable us to recover more useful algebraic structures of underlying modular polynomials. We embed the given MSBs/LSBs to the recovered algebraic structures and construct our partial key exposure attacks. In this full version, we provide overviews and explicit proofs of the triangular matrix constructions. We believe that the additional explanations help readers to understand our techniques. * This is the full version of [TK14c] .
Our Results
In this paper, we propose improved partial key exposure attacks on RSA with the MSBs/LSBs of d. Our attacks work with less partial information than the previous attacks [Aon09, BM03, EJMdW05, SSM10] for d < N 9/16 = N 0.5625 and d < N (9− √ 21)/12 = N 0.368··· with the MSBs and the LSBs, respectively. Furthermore, the most impressive feature of our proposed attacks is that they always work for d < N 0.292··· even when the given partial information is exactly zero. Therefore, our attack with the MSBs is the first one that cover the Boneh-Durfee stronger bound. We also show numerical comparisons for attack conditions. Table 1 
Technical Overview
Here, we summarize technical background of the work. Then, we explain a technical overview of our improvements. 
Unraveled Linearization. As we claimed above, Coppersmith's methods can solve modular equations whose solutions are small in polynomial time. Constructing partial key exposure attacks with less partial information is equivalent to constructing modular equation solving algorithms that can find larger solutions. Technically, it is further equivalent to constructing basis matrices such that lattices spanned by the matrices have shorter vectors. How to construct such matrices is the most technical part in this research area. To resolve the technical issue, Jochemsz and May [JM06] introduced a strategy for the matrix construction. Since the strategy is easy to understand, most works follow it including partial key exposure attacks of Blömer-May [BM03] , Ernst et al. [EJMdW05] , and Sarkar et al. [SSM10] . However, the fact does not mean that the Jochemsz-May strategy For the purpose, the technique first applies linearization and obtain new linearized variables; the linearization combines several monomials into one monomial. Although the linearization has been already taken by numerous papers, the unraveled linearization technique has an additional trick. Reducing the number of monomials has benefit in general, however, the linearization may lose some algebraic information. Hence, during the matrix construction, the technique also applies unraveling that cancels the linearization and separates the combined monomials as they were. The unraveling enables ones to recover the lost algebraic structures. In other words, the unraveled linearization transforms non-triangular basis matrices to triangular ones. Furthermore, if we can apply appropriate unraveling, the matrices preserve useful algebraic structures. Indeed, Herrmann and May [HM10] provided a simpler proof of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. After the proposal, the unraveled linearization technique has been intensively utilized to improve several lattice-based attacks on RSA [BVZ12, Her11, HM10, HHX14, Kun12, KSI14, TK14b, TK14c, TK16a, TK16c, TK17a, TK17b].
Our Approach. In this paper, we fully utilize the unraveled linearization technique and improve partial key exposure attacks with the MSBs/LSBs of d by solving modular equations. In this full version, to help readers to understand our techniques easily, we first provide an alternative proof of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. Although the proof does not have any advantages for the attack, it enables readers to easily understand our subsequent matrix constructions of partial key exposure attacks. In the proof, we apply additional unraveling to Herrmann-May's triangular matrix while the matrix is still triangular. It means that our triangular matrix recovers lost algebraic structures from Herrmann-May's one. Although the recovered algebraic structures do not affect the attack condition of the Boneh-Durfee, they are useful for partial key exposure attacks. Specifically, the recovered structures will enable us to embed the partial information of d.
We 
The analogous attack can be viewed as an extension of the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack that utilize the given MSBs of d. We believe that the attack helps readers to understand how to embed the partial information in Boneh-Durfee's matrix. Then, we provide our main attack that can be viewed as an extension of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack with the partial information. We construct the attack by embedding the partial information in Boneh-Durfee's stronger matrix with additional unraveling. To this end, our additional unraveling becomes effective. Herrmann-May's matrix does not preserve enough algebraic structures to embed the given partial information. On the other hand, by applying additional unraveling, we recovered lost algebraic structures that are useful to embed the partial information. As a result, we can successfully construct the partial key exposure attack that is an extension of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack.
Next, we provide an improved partial key exposure attack with the LSBs of d by solving modular equations. As we suggested above, Blömer-May's attack [BM03] works for the same condition as Ernst et al.'s attack [EJMdW05] and it can be viewed as an extension of the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack that utilized the given LSBs of d. Hence, the result tells us how to embed the given partial information in Boneh-Durfee's weaker matrix. To improve the attack, Aono [Aon09] constructed a matrix that has two layers. The first layer is the same as Blömer-May's matrix while the second layer is the same as Boneh-Durfee's stronger matrix. The second layer did not utilize the partial information at all, however, it was effective to improve Blömer-May's attack. Although Aono analyzed non-triangular basis matrices, we can obtain the same attack condition by using Herrmann-May's matrix, which does not have much algebraic structures to embed the given partial information, in the second layer. In our attack, we construct a matrix, where the second layer is replaced by Boneh-Durfee's stronger matrix with additional unraveling. Since the matrix has more algebraic structures to embed partial information than Aono's one, we can successfully improve the attack.
Related Works
Boneh-Dufee's small secret exponent attack [BD00] is one of the most famous application of Coppersmith's methods [Cop96a, Cop96b] . Thus far, several variants of the attack has been proposed. They include attacks on RSA variants, e.g., unbalanced RSA [DN00, TK16d], prime power RSA [LZPL15, Sar14, Sar16, TK16a], Takagi's RSA [IKK08, IKK09, TK16a] , multi-prime RSA [Hin08] , and RSA with multiple exponent pairs [TK14b] , and its mathematical exten-sions [Kun11, Kun12, KSI14, TK17a] . Recently, Aono et al. [AASW18] found an optimality of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack under heuristic assumptions. As similar settings, there are small CRT exponent attacks [TLP17] . Similarly, there are several partial key exposure on RSA variants, e.g., prime power RSA [LZPL15, TK16a], Takagi's RSA [TK16a] , multi-prime RSA [Hin08, TK17b] , and RSA with multiple exponent pairs [TK14b, TK16c] . As similar settings, several papers study partial key exposure attacks on CRT-RSA [SM09, LZL14, TK15, TK16b].
Roadmap
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall basic tools and an overview of Coppersmith's methods to solve modular equations. In Section 3, we provide an alternative proof of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. In Sections 4 and 5, we study partial key exposure attacks with the MSBs and the LSBs, respectively.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall Coppersmith's method to solve modular equations with small solutions [Cop96b] . Coppersmith's method has been utilized to reveal several vulnerabilities of RSA. See [Cop97, Cop01, May03, May10, NS01] for more information. In this paper, we use HowgraveGraham's simpler reformulation of the method [How97] . At the end of the section, we summarize a basic approach to maximize solvable root bounds by utilizing a notion of helpful polynomials [May10, TK14a] . Based on the lemma, solving bivariate modular equations is reduced to finding two low norm polynomials that has the same small solutions. To find the polynomials, we utilize the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [LLL82] . Let b 1 , . . . , b n be linearly independent k-dimensional vectors. The lattice L(b 1 , . . . , b n ) spanned by the basis vectors b 1 
For bivariate polynomials h(x, y)
When n = k, lattices are described as full rank. The basis matrix of the lattice B is defined as the n × k matrix that has a basis vector b 1 , . . . , b n in each row. In this paper, we use only full rank lattices, i.e., k = n. The determinant of a full rank lattice is computed by vol(L(B)) = |det(B)|. A lattice has infinitely many bases. Finding a basis that contains low norm vectors is a fundamental lattice problem. The LLL algorithm proposed by Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [LLL82] finds short lattice vectors in polynomial time.
Proposition 1 (LLL algorithm [LLL82, May03] in L(b 1 , . . . , b n ) such that
These norms are Euclidean norms. The running time is polynomial in k, n, and the maximum input length of B.
We summarize how Coppersmith's method finds a solution (x,ỹ) of a bivariate modular equation h(x, y) = 0 (mod W ) if |x| < X, |ỹ| < Y . At first, we create n polynomials h 1 (x, y) , . . . , h n (x, y) that have the root (x,ỹ) modulo W m for a positive integer m, and so do any integer linear combinations of h 1 (x, y), . . . , h n (x, y) . Then, we generate basis vectors b 1 , . . . , b n that are coefficient vectors of h 1 (xX, yY ) , . . . , h n (xX, yY ), respectively. All lattice points correspond to polynomials that are integer linear combinations of h 1 (x, y) , . . . , h n (x, y). Hence, applying the LLL algorithm to B, we obtain two short vectors v 1 and v 2 along with their corresponding low norm polynomialsh 1 (x, y) andh 2 (x, y). If norms of the polynomials are enough small to satisfy Howgrave-Graham's lemma, they have the root (x,ỹ) over the integers. The root can efficiently be recovered by computing the Gröbner bases or resultants of the polynomials. The method is heuristic for the bivariate case since the polynomialsh 1 (x, y) andh 2 (x, y) have no assurance of algebraic independency. In this paper, we assume that these polynomials are algebraic independent and the resultant will not vanish. This assumption should be reasonable since few negative cases have been reported.
To conclude this section, we briefly explain how to construct a better matrix to find larger solutions. By using Coppersmith's method, we can recover the root when | det(B)| 1/n < W m by omitting small terms. Hence, we can recover larger solutions if we can construct a matrix B with smaller | det(B)| 1/n for a fixed m. Since matrices B usually tend to be triangular, | det(B)| 1/n is an absolute value of a geometric mean of all diagonals. Thus, May [May10] defined a notion of helpful polynomials whose diagonals in B has smaller absolute values than the modulus W m since such polynomials reduce the quantity of | det(B)| 1/n and contribute to recovering larger solutions. Indeed, Takayasu and Kunihiro [TK14a] constructed matrices by collecting as many helpful polynomials as possible and as few unhelpful polynomials as possible, then improve several algorithms for solving multivariate modular equations.
In this paper, we follow the approach to improve partial key exposure attacks. Furthermore, we extend the definition of helpful to capture special matrices which we will use. Specifically, to recover algebraic structures of modular polynomials, several diagonals of our matrices will change by adding a new polynomial. Hence, to minimize | det(B)| 1/n for fixed m, we use the following notion. 
Definition 1 (Helpful Polynomials

Revisiting Herrmann-May's Matrix
In this section, we recall Herrmann-May's triangular matrix that provides a simpler proof for the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. Then, we provide an alternative triangular matrix with additional unraveling. Although our matrix does not improve Boneh-Durfee's attack at all, it will recover useful algebraic structures that will be essential to improve partial key exposure attacks in the subsequent sections.
Boneh-Durfee's Attack
We first review the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack. Then, we explain how Boneh-Durfee improves it to the stronger attack.
Recall an RSA key generation
where ℓ is an unknown integer. Boneh and Durfee [BD00] solved the following modular equation 
where κ = k/m ≥ 0 is a parameter to be optimized. They constructed a matrix B that has a coefficient vector of g BD.x [u,i] (xX, yY ) for (u, i) ∈ I BD,x and g
BD.y
[u,j] (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD,y1 in each row. Based on the construction, the matrix B becomes triangular as follows.
Lemma 2 (Boneh-Durfee Weaker Matrix [BD00]). Let shift-polynomials g BD.x
[u,i] (x, y) and g
BD.y [u,j] (x, y), sets of indices I BD,x and I BD,y1 , be defined as in (1), (2), respectively. Let B be a matrix whose rows consist of coefficients of g BD.x
[u,i] (xX, yY ) for (u, i) ∈ I BD,x and g
BD.y
[u,j] (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD,y1 . If the shift-polynomials are ordered as 
then the matrix B becomes triangular with diagonals
[u,j] (xX, yY ). Table 3 shows 1 an example of the triangular matrix. By optimizing κ = (1 − 2β)/2, the matrix provides the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack that works when β < (7 − 2 √ 7)/6 = 0.284 · · ·.
To improve the weaker attack, Boneh and Durfee exploited sublattices. To be precise, they used a submatrix of the previous one as a lattice basis. For the purpose, they replaced a set of index I BD,y1 by 2 I BD,y2 := {u = 0, 1, . . . , m; j = 1, 2, . . . , k + ⌊τ u⌋} ,
where τ is a parameter to be optimized such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. By optimizing k = 0 and τ = 1 − 2β, the matrix B that has a coefficient vector of g BD.x [u,i] (xX, yY ) for (u, i) ∈ I BD,x and g
[u,j] (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD,y2 in each row provides the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack that works when β < 1 − 1/ √ 2 = 0.292 · · · . Since the matrix does not become triangular, the analysis is involved. 
Herrmann-May's Matrix
BD.y [u,j] (x, y), sets of indices I BD,x and I BD,y2 , be defined as in (1), (3), respectively. Let B be a matrix whose rows consist of coefficients of g BD.x [u,i] (xX, yY ) for (u, i) ∈ I BD,x and g
BD.y [u,j] (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD,y2 . If the shift-polynomials are ordered as the same way in Lemma 2, then the matrix B becomes triangular with diagonals
[u,j] (xX, yY ). As the last statement suggests, all monomials do not have two variables x and y, simultaneously. Although the linearization z = 1 + xy loses the information of x and y, it can be recovered by unraveling. Table 4 shows an example of the triangular matrix. The triangular matrix enables us to analyze the structure easily. Indeed, the following lemma shows one evidence of the optimality of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. 
that is smaller than or equal to the modulus e m if and only if
Hence, we conclude the proof.
The lemma suggests that the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack used only helpful g
BD.y
[u,j] (x, y) and no unhelpful g
[u,j] (x, y). That is why they could successfully improve their own weaker attack. However, we should note that the lemma does not prove a rigorous optimality of the attack.
Herrmann-May's Matrix with Additional Unraveling
In this subsection, we show a new triangular matrix for the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack. In short, we apply additional unraveling to Herrmann-May's triangular matrix. Then, there are several monomials which have two variables x and y, simultaneously, in our matrix. Before providing the matrix, we introduce some functions that will be used to control the power of unraveling throughout the paper. 
Then, we provide our matrix. 
In Herrmann-May's matrix, two variables x and y does not appear in the same monomials. Specifically, X does not appear in diagonals of g
BD.y
[u,j] (x, y). However, X appears in our matrix. It means that we apply less linearization z = 1 + xy or more unraveling than Herrmann-May's matrix. How much we apply linearization/unraveling is controlled by a function l LSBs k,τ (j). Table 5 shows an example of the matrix that has the same polynomials as Herrmann-May's matrix in Table 4 
[2,1] whereas our matrix has diagonals y, xy 2 , and x 2 y 3 for the same polynomials. We apply additional unravelings z ⇒ 1 + xy and transform the former diagonals to the latter ones by using the following simple relations:
The relation suggests that all integer linear combinations of (y, yz) and (y, yz, yz 2 ) can be replaced by those of (y, xy 2 ) and (y, xy 2 , x 2 y 3 ), respectively. Hence, the matrix is still triangular even if we apply the additional unravelings. Here, we want to claim that integer linear combinations of (yz) and (yz, yz 2 ) cannot be rewritten as those of (xy 2 ) and (xy 2 , x 2 y 3 ), respectively. To apply the additional unraveling, the existence of y was essential. Without the variable y, we cannot replace yz by xy 2 . However, since yz exists, we can replace yz 2 by xy 2 z by using a relation
Therefore, we define the function l LSBs
exists, however, 
Therefore, the function l LSBs k,τ (j) tells us the maximum unraveling which we can apply. The matrix with additional unraveling does not provide any benefits in the context of BonehDurfee's attack. We use the matrix to explain an overview of an unraveled linearization for our partial key exposure attacks with the LSBs in Section 5.3. Here, we show an inductive proof that (j). We assume that the statement holds for fixed (u ′ , j ′ ) and prove that the statement also holds for (u ′ + 1, j ′ ). It follows that
where
are integers. Hence, the statement holds for all (u, j). By using the relation, we can replace all integer linear combinations of
. Hence, we complete the proof.
As we claimed, the function l LSBs k,τ (j) tells us the maximum unraveling which we can apply to Herrmann-May's matrix B. On the other hand, Herrmann-May's matrix B is still triangular when we apply less additional unraveling than the above one. For example, Herrmann-May's matrix B can be modified as a triangular matrix with diagonals
holds for (u, j) ∈ I BD.y2 since j ≤ k + τ u. Hence, when we apply an unraveling by the function l M SBs k,τ (u + j), there are less and more Z's in diagonals for g
[u,j] (xX, yY ) than Herrmann-May's 
original matrix and a matrix with an additional unraveling by the function l LSBs k,τ (j). We omit a proof that a matrix with an unraveling by the function l M SBs k,τ (u + j) is triangular with the above diagonals since the proof is almost the same as the that of Lemma 5. We use the matrix to explain an overview of an unraveled linearization for our partial key exposure attacks with the MSBs in Section 4.4. Table 6 shows an example of the matrix with an additional unraveling by the function l M SBs k,τ (u+ j), where the matrix has the same polynomials as Tables 4 and 5. Herrmann-May's matrix in Table 4 has diagonals z, xz, z 2 , and yz 2 for g BD.
, and g
[2,1] whereas our matrix has diagonals xy, x 2 y, xyz, and xy 2 z for the same polynomials. Our matrix in Table 5 has diagonals xy 2 , x 2 y 2 , and x 2 y 3 for g BD.y
[0,2] , and g
[2,1] whereas our matrix in Table 6 has diagonals yz, xyz, and xy 2 z for the same polynomials.
Partial Key Exposure Attacks with the MSBs
In this section, we propose our improved partial key exposure attack on RSA with the MSBs of d. In Section 4.1, we formulate the attack scenario as a modular equation. In Section 4.2, we recall previous attacks [EJMdW05, SSM10] . In Section 4.3, we propose an attack that works in the same condition as Ernst et al.'s attack [EJMdW05] by solving modular equations. In Section 4.4, we propose our main attack.
Formulation
In this subsection, we formulate the attack scenario with the MSBs as modular equations. We 
with an unknown integer ℓ as in Section 3.1. Let publicly computable ℓ 0 = ⌊(ed 0 M − 1)/N ⌋ be an approximation to ℓ since
Hence, we can bound unknown |ℓ − ℓ 0 | < N γ such that γ = max{δ, β − 1/2} within a constant factor. By taking modulo e of the equation (4), we obtain a modular polynomial
whose root is (x, y) = (ℓ − ℓ 0 , −p − q + 1). Absolute values of the root are bounded above by X := N γ and Y := N 1/2 within constant factors.
Previous Works
In this subsection, we briefly recall previous attacks proposed by Ernst 
Revisiting Ernst et al.'s Attack by Solving Modular Equations
In this subsection, we show that by solving modular equation f M SBs (x, y) = 0 as Sarkar et al., we can obtain an attack that works in Ernst et al.'s condition (1). We believe that a content in this subsection will be useful to understand our improved attacks in Section 4.4.
Technically, we use the same shift-polynomials as Sarkar et al., however, we use sets of indices I BD,x and I BD,y1 as the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack to construct a basis matrix B. Furthermore, we employ the unraveled linearization to construct triangular matrices. Observe that the modular polynomial
becomes the same as Boneh-Durfee's one
by introducing a linearized variable
where the absolute value of the solution w = ℓ is bounded above by W := N β within a constant factor. Hence, our matrix construction starts from that of the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack in Section 3.1. Then, we partially apply unraveling w = ℓ 0 + x to utilize the given MSBs. (wW, xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD, y1 . If the shift-polynomials are ordered as
(wW, xX, yY ).
If we apply linearization ℓ 0 + x ⇒ w to all terms, f M SBs (x, y) = f BD (w, y) holds. Hence, a basis matrix B is the same as that of the Boneh-Durfee weaker attack in Lemma 2. To utilize partial information ℓ 0 , we apply unraveling w ⇒ ℓ 0 + x and obtain a matrix as stated in Lemma 6. How much we apply linearization/unraveling is controlled by a function l M SBs k,0 (·). Table 7 shows an example of the matrix that has the same polynomials as Boneh-Durfee's weaker matrix in whereas our matrix has diagonals y, xy, and x 2 y for the same polynomials. We apply unravelings w ⇒ ℓ 0 + x and transform the former diagonals to the latter diagonals by using the following simple relations: 
The relation suggests that all integer linear combinations of (y, wy) and (y, wy, w 2 y) can be rewritten as those of (y, xy) and (y, xy, x 2 y), respectively. Hence, the matrix is still triangular even if we apply the unravelings. Here, we want to claim that integer linear combinations of (wy) and (wy, w 2 y) cannot be rewritten as those of (xy) and (xy, x 2 y), respectively. To apply the above unraveling, the existence of y is essential. Without the variable y, we cannot replace wy and w 2 y by xy and x 2 y, respectively. However, if wy exists, we can replace w 2 y by wxy since In other words, in the set of indices I BD.y1 , there are indices (u,
Therefore, the function l M SBs k,0 (·) tells us the maximum unraveling which we can apply.
Proof of Lemma 6. From Lemma 2, it is straightforward that we can prove the shift-polynomials in Lemma 6 derive a triangular basis matrix with diagonals
We apply unraveling w = ℓ 0 + x to each variable of the above matrix. Since the diagonals of g M SBs.x (i y ). We assume that the statement holds for fixed u = u ′ and prove that the statement also holds for u = u ′ + 1. It follows that
To obtain the bound (i), we compute a dimension 
New polynomials which are derived from outputs of the LLL algorithm satisfy Howgrave-Graham's lemma when (det(B)) 1/n < e m , i.e.,
by omitting small terms. To maximize the right hand side of the inequality, we set
and obtain an inequality
By solving the inequality, we obtain the condition (1) of Ernst et al.'s attack
since γ = δ holds. Hence, we conclude the proof.
Our Attack
In this subsection, we propose our improved partial key exposure attacks with the MSBs of d. 
and B ′ be a matrix that is a matrix B without the polynomial g M SBs.y
Furthermore, diagonals of polynomials
On the other hand, by following the proof of Lemma 7, diagonals of the same polynomials in B ′ are
and
To obtain the bound (i) of Theorem 1, we compute a dimension
and a determinant det
New polynomials which are derived from outputs of the LLL algorithm satisfy Howgrave-Graham's lemma when (det(B)) 1/n < e m . By omitting small terms, we obtain an inequality
By solving the inequality, we obtain the first bound (i) of Theorem 1
since γ = δ holds. Hence, we conclude the proof. New polynomials which are derived from outputs of the LLL algorithm satisfy Howgrave-Graham's lemma when (det(B)) 1/n < e m . By omitting small terms, we obtain an inequality 6γσ − 3σ 2 + 2σ 3 < (σ − 2(β − γ)) 3 2 + 2γ − 4β .
To maximize the right hand side of the inequality, we set
and obtain the condition (ii) of Theorem 1. Hence, we conclude the proof.
Partial Key Exposure Attacks with the LSBs
In this section, we propose our improved partial key exposure attack on RSA with the LSBs of d. In Section 5.1, we formulate the attack scenario as a modular equation. In Section 5.2, we recall previous attacks [BM03, EJMdW05, Aon09] . In Section 5.3, we propose our main attack.
Formulation
In this subsection, we formulate the attack scenario with the LSBs as modular equations. We (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I BD,y1 , and g LSBs.Aon [u,j] (xX, yY ) for (u, j) ∈ I Aon to construct a non-triangular matrix B. Aono claimed that the matrix B is not triangular. However, we find that by utilizing an unraveled linearization with a linearized variable z := 1 + xy and the matrix becomes triangular. Table 9 shows an example of the triangular matrix. 
The diagonals of g (x, y) of Aono's matrix. Table 10 shows an example of the matrix that has the same polynomials as Aono's matrix in Table 9 . To illustrate our idea, we use the examples. The matrix in Table 9 has a diagonal Y 2 Z 2 M 2 for g LSBs.Aon [2, 2] whereas our matrix has diagonals XY 3 ZM for the analogous polynomial g LSBs.y [2, 2] . Since Y 2 Z 2 = XY 3 Z, the diagonal in Table 10 is smaller by a factor M . We reduce the factor by using the polynomial f LSBs (x, y) which was not used in g LSBs.Aon holds, where c By solving the inequality, we obtain the bound of Theorem 2 δ < 1 + β − √ −1 + 6β − 3β 2 2 .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed improved partial key exposure attacks on RSA with the MSBs and the LSBs of d. In particular, our attack with the MSBs and the LSBs is better than all known attacks when d is small such that d < N 9/16 and d < N (9− √ 21)/12 , respectively. Furthermore, our attack with the MSBs is the first result that is an extension of the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack and always works for d < N 1−1/ √ 2 . We obtained these improved attacks by utilizing the unraveled linearization technique and fully exploit the structure of the lattice for the Boneh-Durfee stronger attack.
